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Religious Education after Conflicts: Promoting Social Cohesion or 
Entrenching Existing Cleavages? 
Dr Giuditta Fontana, Centre for the Study of Divided Societies, King’s College London 
 
This article considers initiatives to reform religious education after violent 
identity-based conflicts in Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia. The Taif 
Agreement, Belfast Agreement and Ohrid Agreement mapped extensive 
education reforms and established consociational power-sharing in the three 
jurisdictions, altering state identity and inter-communal hierarchies. The existing 
literature generates two hypotheses on the political function of religious 
education after violent conflicts: (a) religious education tends to entrench existing 
ethnic, national and political cleavages; or (b) religious education helps further 
mutual knowledge, integration and social cohesion after violent conflicts. This 
comparative research employs original interviews and documents to evaluate 
initiatives to reform religious education (as a curricular subject) in post-conflict 
Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia. It suggests that the first hypothesis 
reflects more accurately the political function of education: religious education 
helps entrench existing cleavages in these deeply divided societies, but this 
does not necessarily hamper short-term peace and political stability. 
1 Introduction	  and	  Literature	  
Collective narratives of identity have an important function during violent conflicts and are 
equally crucial to the success of peace processes. Religion is part and parcel of such 
narratives: whilst theories of modernization assumed that it would wither away, religion 
remains a central component of communal identity (Ivekovic, 2002:  523). This is the case 
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especially where religious cleavages coincide with other politically salient markers of identity 
such as nationality or ethnicity, as in Lebanon, Northern Ireland and the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (Macedonia). As a fundamentally exclusive marker of belonging, 
religious allegiance remains a highly effective instrument for group definition and 
differentiation (Murgescu, 2002:  296). Confessional cleavages may be even more effective 
in cementing group cohesion because ‘if the religion has an unquestionable missionary zeal, 
the confessional community turns inward, bound up in its past, proud of its identity and 
apprehensive about its future’ (Salamé, 1986:  3). Thus, religion and confession can 
legitimise nation- and state-building projects and inform the collective memory of ethnic and 
national communities. But how is religion taught to children in societies emerging from 
violent identity-based conflicts? Does religious education typically foster integration and 
social cohesion? Does it cement the previously warring mutually exclusive communities? 
This article considers initiatives to reform the curriculum of religious education (RE) in 
Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia after their current peace agreements (the 1989 
Taif Agreement, the 1998 Belfast Agreement and the 2001 Ohrid Agreement, respectively). 
It is widely accepted that official institutions, such as schools, produce and reproduce 
collective narratives of identity through their contents (curricula) and structures. However, it 
is not clear how schools adapt to new political realities after peace agreements, particularly 
in traditionally plural societies, where several ethnic, religious, national linguistic or cultural 
groups live separately but close to each other (Skeie, 2002: 53). The three peace 
agreements singled out education as a mechanism for the promotion of mutual 
understanding, social cohesion and reconciliation through common curricula and mixed 
schools. However, they also established (or re-established) consociational power-sharing in 
Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia. Consociations allow all relevant ethnic, religious 
and national groups to participate in political and non-political institutions through executive 
power-sharing, autonomy, proportional representation and veto rights (Lijphart, 1977). They 
alter the identity of the state, its relationship to local communities, inter-communal 
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hierarchies and patterns of interaction. According to Lijphart, consociational power-sharing, 
rather than eroding inter-group boundaries, ‘make[s] societies more thoroughly plural’ in the 
short term (Lijphart, 1977: 42). This questions whether schools can emerge as instruments 
for mutual understanding and integration in post-conflict consociations (as stipulated by the 
peace agreements) or whether their contribution to peace and political stability is more 
complex. 
Comparative analysis of RE can shed valuable light on this question. This is because, as 
Skeie puts it, RE is highly ‘identity-sensitive’ (Nelson, 2007:  6). This article focuses primarily 
on the arrangements for the teaching of RE as a curricular subject, but it will also incidentally 
consider the implications of the RE curriculum on the structure of the education system 
(particularly in regard to the separation or mixing of children belonging to different faith 
backgrounds). There is general agreement that a RE curriculum should provide some 
knowledge and understanding of religion (Skeie, 2002, 56). However, two other hypotheses 
on the political function of RE can be drawn from the existing literature.  
The first hypothesis is that an RE curriculum should be designed and delivered by religious 
authorities, and nurture children’s sense of belonging to a faith community. As Skeie puts it 
looking at Western Europe, this approach ‘is countering relativism, indifferentism, 
disintegration’ in modern society (Skeie, 2006, 24). Arguments in favour of this approach to 
RE mirror closely the arguments in support of state-funded religious schools: it would signal 
the state’s respect for its faith communities, enshrine inter-communal equality and promote 
the inclusion and allegiance of members of the major religious communities to the state 
(Jackson, 2003, 90 Interviewee 1; Matevski, 2009:  7). Yet, in a deeply divided society this 
approach would primarily help socialize children in the culture and practices of discreet 
ethnic, national and political communities.  
The second hypothesis is that an RE curriculum should be designed by the state to transmit 
knowledge about a variety of religious and non-religious beliefs and practices and explore 
ethical and moral issues through dialogue and comparison (Kuburić & Moe, 2006:  3; 
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Richardson, 2013:  11; White, 2004:  154, 162). According to Skeie, this approach would 
counter ‘conflicts among religious and ethnic groups, discriminations, racism’ (Skeie, 2006: 
24). It would also address the core criticisms to a confessional approach to RE: the danger 
of indoctrination and proselytization and the erosion of ‘social cohesion through separating 
young people of different religious and non-religious backgrounds’ (Jackson, 2003: 93; 
Chadwick, 1994:  131; Gallagher, 2005:  434; Nelson, 2004:  253; Kassis, 2002:  368; 
Kuburić & Moe, 2006:  3, 6; Richardson, 2008:  2). In other words, it would foster mutual 
understanding, ecumenism and social cohesion in deeply divided societies by challenging 
‘prejudice and indoctrination… through those very aspects of education where there might 
appear to be the greatest danger of them occurring’ (Richardson, 2013: 9). 
This article will consider arrangements for the teaching of RE as a curricular subject before, 
during and after the conflicts in Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia, respectively. 
Then, it will draw some comparative conclusions: RE is taught in state-funded schools when 
religion is salient to collective identities and when religious and political elites are 
interdependent. The specific current arrangements for RE in Lebanon, Northern Ireland and 
Macedonia also suggest that RE helps entrench existing cleavages, making ‘societies more 
thoroughly plural’ (Lijphart, 1977: 42) rather than furthering mutual understanding and 
integration. In societies adopting consociational power-sharing, this may foster stability and 
peace, at least in the short term. 
2 Method	  
This comparative study is based on qualitative research carried out in three deeply divided 
societies. The author conducted original semi-structured interviews in Lebanon, Northern 
Ireland and Macedonia in 2012-13. She interviewed a total of twenty-two curriculum writers, 
experts of RE, and policymakers in the three jurisdictions (eight in Northern Ireland, seven in 
Lebanon and seven in Macedonia). Interviewees were selected on the basis of their 
professional background and contribution to the local debate about RE, but also to ensure 
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broad representation of all the relevant religious, ethnic and national communities. They 
were given the opportunity to use an interpreter, but they all chose to carry out the interview 
in English. The semi-structured interviews lasted about one hour, and questions focused on 
the participants’ experience and opinions about past and current approaches to RE and their 
relationship to conflict and peace-building. Nineteen interviews were recorded with the 
consent of participants, and the author manually transcribed the recordings verbatim. Three 
interviewees did not grant consent for recording, so the author took extensive notes during 
and immediately after the interview. Throughout fieldwork, the author compiled a journal 
recording non-verbal cues, to aid the subsequent analysis. The author carried out a 
deductive analysis of the interview data, manually coding the content of transcripts and 
notes to identify patterns across the three case studies and recurrent themes. When 
necessary, participants were contacted for follow-up questions to clarify their statements and 
ensure the genuine representation of their views. Curricula, official documents and reports 
were similarly coded manually to identify recurrent themes and substantiate the interview 
evidence.  
The three case studies were selected according to the most different systems design 
method of comparative research.  Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia differ in many 
respects. In particular, in Lebanon and Northern Ireland religious confession is at the very 
heart of the cultural expressions and political mobilization of different communities. Since 
independence in 1943, the Lebanese consociational political system assigned a fixed 
number of seats to each confessional community, reflecting (but also entrenching) 
overlapping confessional, political and national identities. Similarly, in Northern Ireland, 
‘Catholic’ and ‘Protestant’ remain shorthand for different cultural, political and national 
allegiances (Arlow, 2004:  263). In contrast, in Macedonia religious allegiance was not 
salient to state and communal identity until the late 1990s: under socialist Yugoslavia, 
linguistic and ethnic identities were paramount. However, the three case studies are similar 
in one important respect: they all experienced violent inter-group conflict that was regulated 
 6 
through consociational power-sharing. The most different systems design method of 
comparative research is ideally suited to generate hypotheses vis-à-vis a novel research 
field, and to highlight patterns among few case studies (Landman, 2008: 29). Thus, it is 
appropriate to explore for the first time the political function of RE in consociations. Due to 
the limited number of interviews and of case studies, further research should be undertaken 
to test the findings on other deeply divided societies before generalizing these finding to all 
societies adopting consociational power-sharing.  
3 The	  Political	  Function	  of	  Religious	  Education	  
The Taif, Belfast and Ohrid agreements regulated Lebanon’s Civil War, Northern Ireland’s 
Troubles and Macedonia’s ethnic conflict by establishing consociational power-sharing. They 
also postulated extensive education reforms, including amendments to the curricula for 
history and citizenship education (in the Taif Agreement), increased opportunities for mother 
tongue instruction (in the Ohrid Agreement) and the promotion of state schools and of mixed 
schooling (in the Taif and Belfast Agreements). Yet, the three peace agreements did not 
consider RE.  
To examine the arrangements for the teaching of RE as a curricular subject in Lebanon, 
Northern Ireland and Macedonia, the next sections will survey the RE curriculum prior to 
their current peace agreements before exploring the extensive debates over RE in each 
post-conflict society. They aim to establish if RE typically: (a) helps socialize children in the 
culture and practices of separate ethnic, national and confessional communities or (b) 
fosters integration and mutual understanding. 
3.1 Religious	  Education	  in	  Lebanon	  	  
RE had a clear political function before and during the conflict in Lebanon: it helped socialize 
children in the culture and practices of separate confessional communities. The subject was 
introduced in state schools only in 1973: previously, religious authorities had protected their 
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prerogative to impart RE only in private religious schools without state interference 
(Abouchedid, Nasser, & Van Blommestein, 2002). When it was introduced, RE was a 
confessional subject, taught by clerics, and children were separated into different groups 
according to their religious background (Bashshour, 2003:  160; Frayha, 2004:  196). During 
the 1975-89 civil war, RE was criticized for directly contributing to the conflict by socialising 
children into hostile and exclusive narratives of identity and indirectly justifying their physical 
separation along confessional lines (Interviewee 19).  
The Taif Agreement postulated the creation of common textbooks for history and citizenship 
education ‘in a manner that strengthens national belonging, fusion, spiritual and cultural 
openness’ (Document of National Accord  1989). Interviewees recall that the omission of RE 
was conspicuous, as many wished to employ the RE curriculum to ‘make people belong to 
the same nation… independently of the religious links’ (Interviewee 19) and promote societal 
integration (Interviewee 21). Others defended communal rights to impart confessional RE in 
state schools to provide children with ‘ethical guidance’ and nurture their faith development 
(Bashshour, 2003: 160-161). 
In 1997, the Council of Ministers, including representatives of all the main confessional 
groups in Lebanon, voted to eliminate RE from the national curriculum, thereby abolishing 
the subject in state schools (Bashshour, 2003:  160; Abu Assali, 2013). Recognizing that 
private schools were legally entitled to supplement the national curriculum with additional 
subjects, the power-sharing executive established that private schools could only teach RE 
on ‘weekends, and only for those who wish’ (Interviewee 19; confirmed by Khalife, 2006:  
153). This decision faced immediate opposition by a broad coalition of religious institutions, 
which refused to make RE optional in private religious schools and lobbied aggressively for 
the reintroduction of RE in state schools (Khalife, 2006:  153; Interviewee 19). Clerical 
pressure succeeded in eroding the Cabinet’s decision: in September 1998, Prime Minister 
Rafic Hariri declared that RE was ‘the foundation stone for the social, ethical and ideological 
existence of Lebanon’ (Bashshour, 2003:  161). In a further step towards mending fences 
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with religious authorities, in late 1998 the Cabinet instructed the Centre for Educational 
Research and Development (CERD) to ‘study the possibility of adding religion to the 
curricula’ (Frayha, 2004:  188). By November 1999, the Cabinet had reinstated one weekly 
hour of RE in state schools, and tasked CERD with preparing a unified RE curriculum and 
textbook (Bashshour, 2003:  162).  
Interviewees suggested that the Cabinet envisaged a non-confessional and integrationist RE 
curriculum. Former CERD directors Frayha and Abu Assali claimed that in late 1999 CERD 
started working on a RE curriculum, taught by lay teachers according to a common unified 
textbook (Abou Assali, 2012; Interviewee 19; Frayha, 2004:  188). RE was expected to 
emphasize common values and convey uniform narratives of belonging, thereby contributing 
to ‘national unity’ and social cohesion in post-war Lebanon (Frayha, 2004:  188; Abu Assali, 
2013). Frayha recalls that the RE textbook drafting committee included specialists in 
theology and curriculum writing appointed by CERD as well as clergymen chosen by the 
‘major religious sects’ (Interviewee 19; Frayha, 2004:  189). This reflected the somewhat 
contradictory assumption that the clergies retained a fundamental responsibility for the 
religious education of children.  
In fact, Frayha, who chaired the curriculum drafting committee, recalls that clergy members 
immediately demanded two sets of textbooks and curricula, one for Christians and one for 
Muslims (Interviewee 19; Frayha, 2013:  189). An official present at the meetings reported 
that discussions stalled because Muslim members of the committee insisted on describing 
Christianity through the prism of Islam (Interviewee 20), but this view was not confirmed by 
other interviewees. Instead, they suggests that, rather than focusing on a comparative, non-
confessional curriculum, the drafting committee embarked upon the task of drafting a 
confessional curriculum for the faith development of children of different persuasions 
(Interviewee 19). This amounted to framing an ecumenical synthesis of Islam and 
Christianity and unsurprisingly, it proved too arduous for the curriculum drafting committee.   
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In a policy turnabout, in October 2000 the Lebanese cabinet declared that there would be 
two sets of curricula and textbooks, one for Muslims and one for Christians. It also timidly 
suggested that each textbook should contain some information about the other religion 
(Frayha, 2004:  189). If students of different religions sat in the same class, the Minister of 
Education suggested ‘let[ting] the Christians learn in the Christian book and the Muslims in 
the Muslim book’ (Bashshour, 2003:  162). Frayha recalls that this compromise did not 
satisfy religious authorities: reportedly, clergy members on the curriculum drafting 
committees called on the cabinet to amend its instructions because no Christian was 
comfortable and qualified to teach about Islam and vice versa (Interviewee 19; Frayha, 
2004:  189). Frayha recalled that at this point, the Druze representative on the drafting 
committee, who had insisted on a unified RE textbook, resigned (Frayha, 2013:  109). At 
approximately the same time, Frayha was ‘relieved’ from his post because of a controversy 
over the contents of the common history textbook and ‘the whole [RE] issue was frozen’ 
(Interviewee 19; see also Frayha, 2013:  109). 
As a consequence, RE retains an ambiguous status in Lebanon: it is part of the national 
curriculum but lacks any centrally prescribed aims and contents. All the experts and 
policymakers interviewed agree that in state schools, local religious authorities impart RE, 
define its contents and appoint RE teachers (Khalife, 2006: 149; Abu Assali, 2013). They 
mostly agree with Abu Assali, who claims that the lack of a common RE curriculum means 
that religious figures can ‘go and teach what they want’ during the weekly hour of RE 
(Interviewee 21). Empirical research corroborates the interview data: private schools, even 
more than state institutions, teach RE ‘as they see fit’, and RE often amounts to religious 
instruction and the performing of religious rituals (Abouchedid et al., 2002; International 
Crisis Group, 2010:  22; Frayha, 2013:  108; Khalife, 2006: 154). RE is usually taught by 
clergymen of the same sect as the majority of students, and this allows for religious outreach 
within the safe confines of a particular confessional community (Daou, 2012; Frayha, 2004:  
190).  
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Beyond entrenching clerical influence over schools, Frayha claimed that RE encourages the 
labeling and creation of a sense of difference among children (Interviewee 19). He asserts 
that the contents of RE, and the separation of children of different faiths during its teaching, 
constructs RE (and religion more generally) as an instrument for exclusion. The literature 
confirms that existing arrangements for the RE curriculum have important implications for 
the structure of the education system and Lebanese society. Arrangements for RE may 
further the conflation of religious allegiance with communal belonging, and the perception of 
schools as bulwarks of group identity. This, in turn, justifies the proliferation of private 
confessional schools, competing with state schools for government subsidies and 
perpetuating the physical separation of children. 
Moreover, a 2000 study of seventy-seven RE textbooks highlighted widespread use of 
discriminatory language, frequent juxtaposition of ‘Christian’ and ‘Muslim’, encouragement of 
feelings of superiority over other religions and emphasis on dogma and indoctrination 
(Frayha, 2004:  190; Khalife, 2006:  157). RE may therefore help reproduce the prejudices 
underpinning inter-communal conflict in Lebanon.  
Finally, Christian confessions formulated a common textbook for the RE of Christian children 
(Wehbe & Labaki, 2012), but a variety of different books exist for the spiritual education of 
Muslim children. In an interview, a senior officer at CERD, reported the credible view that the 
political tensions between the Sunni and Shia communities hampered attempts at 
formulating a common RE textbook (Interviewee 20). Thus, the contents of RE may reflect 
the evolving political salience of communal identities in post-civil war Lebanon, where the 
Sunni-Shia divide has overshadowed other cleavages.  
In sum, the interview data collected in Lebanon suggest that the Taif agreement did not alter 
the political function of RE. Interviews with experts and policymakers suggest that RE was 
shaped foremost by the interdependent relationship between clerical and political elites, 
which dictated the marginalization a common RE curriculum in the late 1990s. As Abu Assali 
puts it, politicians appeased the clergies ‘because their force, their strength, their re-election’ 
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depends on their relationship to religious leaders (Interviewee 21; the same point was made 
by Interviewee 19). Indeed, the interviews corroborate the literature in suggesting that RE as 
a curricular subject helps socialize children in the culture and practices of mutually exclusive 
confessional communities, which overlap with political groups. 
3.2 Religious	  Education	  in	  Northern	  Ireland	  	  
In Northern Ireland, the 1947 Education Act entrenched the role of the RE curriculum as a 
‘means of induction into a particular religious, and often denominational, tradition’ (Greer, 
1991:  190). This had important structural consequences: the Protestant clergy’s influence 
over non-denominational Bible instruction in state controlled schools justified the existence 
of a Catholic maintained school sector providing ‘a Catholic education, on Catholic 
principles, with Catholic masters and the use of Catholic books’ (Darby, 1976:  125; 
Armstrong, 2009:  300). Thus, the RE curriculum underpinned the creation of separate 
school sectors catering for different communities, and later discouraged initiatives for mixed 
education (Barnes, 1997:  73).  
However, in 1992, a working party composed of delegates of the four largest Christian 
denominations in Northern Ireland (the Catholic Church, Church of Ireland, Presbyterian 
Church and Methodist Church) produced a Core Syllabus for Religious Education. 
Interviewees agreed with the literature that the formulation of a common syllabus appeared 
as ‘a moment of historic change’ (Chadwick, 1994:  178; Interviewee 4), and as a 
contribution to solving a conflict that many saw as essentially religious (Barnes, 1997:  78; 
Interviewee 3; Interviewee 2). However, participants also pointed out that only the four 
largest churches were invited to contribute to the syllabus (Interviewee 7; Interviewee 4), 
reflecting the close relationship between political and religious elites in Northern Ireland and 
the desire to restore it after a bitter dispute over the merging of the separate teacher training 
colleges (Richardson, 2008:  9). The literature also questions the ecumenical and 
integrationist potential of the RE syllabus. Nelson argues that the RE syllabus reflects the 
conviction of the four main Churches that RE was the only subject ‘beyond the interference 
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of secular planners’ as well as their solidarity against ‘secular forces’ (Nelson, 2007:  9). 
Thus, it did not challenge the confessional approach of Catholic Maintained schools nor the 
non-denominational (but Christian-oriented) approach of de facto Protestant controlled 
schools (Chadwick, 1994:  179). Whilst enshrining the aspiration to employ RE to foster 
mutual knowledge and understanding in Northern Ireland, the RE syllabus remained 
criticized for its Christian exclusiveness and for perpetuating the psychological separation of 
children belonging to different Christian denomination. 
In 2002, with an ‘unusually narrow exercise of statutory powers’, the government called only 
representatives of the ‘four main churches’ to revise the core RE syllabus (Northern Ireland 
Assembly, 2007; Interviewee 1). An expert reported that in private meetings, civil servants 
insisted that the precedent of exclusive clerical control over RE, established with the 1992 
syllabus, could not be overturned (Interviewee 7). Indeed, interviewees suggested that (as in 
Lebanon) religious authorities, politicians and bureaucrats still largely perceive the RE 
curriculum as an exclusive ‘preserve’ of the Catholic and Protestant clergies (Interviewee 7; 
Interviewee 4, Interviewee 5). In contrast to Lebanon, though, the Department of Education 
(DENI) and the Council for Curriculum, Examinations and Assessment (CCEA) attempted to 
influence the syllabus working group. For example, they insisted on providing an 
‘understanding of world religions’ (Arlow, 2004:  296).  
All the experts interviewed asserted that the 2007 core syllabus is more conducive than its 
predecessor to the teaching of several Christian traditions and to the tackling of issues 
related to morality, conflict and reconciliation (Interviewee 2; Interviewee 3; Interviewee 7). 
Specifically, it includes a module on world religions (for pupils between the ages of 11 and 
14) and prescribes the study of the ‘Roman Catholic tradition and at least one Protestant 
tradition’ for pupils between the ages of 14 and 16 (Armstrong, 2009:  301;  Interviewees 3; 
Interviewee 2; Interviewee 5). Yet, the interviews also highlight that in practice the 2007 
syllabus is very flexible and remarkably similar to its predecessor (Interviewee 2). Experts 
point out that it does not establish the aims and pedagogical approach of RE (Interviwee 7) 
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and disregards the fundamental debate over whether RE is ‘indoctrination or an academic 
study of religion’ (Interviewee 4). Others argued that, similarly to its predecessor, it papers 
over the two intrinsically different approaches to RE in Northern Ireland’s fragmented school 
system: doctrinal teaching for faith development in Catholic maintained schools and non-
denominational teaching in controlled (de facto Protestant) schools (Interviewee 2;  
Interviewee 7; Nelson, 2007:  12). Thus, ‘people [can] take what they want from the syllabus’ 
(Interviewee 2). Reportedly, this is because, similarly to the Lebanese Ministry of Education, 
DENI has little or no control over RE and very few schools ever requested government 
inspections for RE (Interviewee 7; Barnes, 1997:  75-76; Greer, 1991:  196; Interviewee 3; 
Interviewee 2).  
Several interviewees questioned whether the 2007 syllabus is ‘fit for [the] purpose’ of 
providing an understanding of diversity and of the complexities of Northern Ireland’s society 
(Interviewee 2; point also raised by Richardson, 2013: 7-8). According to an expert, the 
syllabus’ contents are premised on the assumption that children are either Christian ‘or in 
need of becoming Christians’ (Interviewee 7) and another interviewee characterized the 
syllabus as a ‘compromise between fundamentalist Catholics and fundamentalist 
Protestants’ (Interviewee 4). Other participants agree that RE in primary schools focuses 
either on Protestant traditions or allows for the participation in the Catholic rituals and 
sacraments through flexible contents and different textbook series (Interviewee 2;  
Interviewee 7). The contradictions inherent to this dual approach are most obvious in 
integrated schools (attended by children belonging to both communities). Here, while 
Catholic children prepare for the sacraments, other children may follow an alternative 
‘Delving Deeper’ programme (Richardson, 2013:  20). Physically separating children during 
RE contradicts the integrated movement’s emphasis on ecumenism and on open discussion 
of religious rituals (Richardson, 2013:  21) and may help socialize children into the separate 
narratives and identities of Northern Ireland’s confessional and national communities even in 
integrated schools. In sum, despite the existence of a core RE syllabus, the political function 
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of RE in Northern Ireland is remarkably similar to that of RE in Lebanon: it helps reproduce 
the mutually exclusive Catholic/Nationalist and Protestant/Unionist communities.  
The interviewees added that rather than tackling issues related to identity and conflict, the 
RE curriculum helps consolidate children’s identification with a religious denomination, 
coinciding with wider national and political allegiances (Interviewee 3; Interviewee 2; 
Interviewee 7; see also Richardson, 2009:  8; 2013:  8-10). A participant reported ‘a 
tendency to play safe, to take the traditional route, which was confessional teaching of 
religious education and to avoid controversial issues and discussion which may raise 
questions relating to other religions and their meanings’ (Interviewee 3). This is not 
accidental: the syllabus working group refused to introduce modules on world religions and 
comparative Christian traditions in primary school, maintaining that this could confuse 
children instead of ‘consolidating their grasp of their primary culture’ (Armstrong, 2009:  307; 
echoed by Interviewee 7). Even at age 11 to 14, the ‘four main churches’ recommended to 
employ only a ‘modest amount of teaching time’ on world religions (Armstrong, 2009:  301-
302; Department of Education Northern Ireland, 2006:  3; Interviewee 7; Richardson, 2013:  
16-17). Research shows that most schools complied with this recommendation (Armstrong, 
2009:  301; Interviewee 2; Interviewee 7; Richardson, 2007:  8). Indeed, the CCEA 
Executive Director confirmed that the CCEA’s GCSE market share in Northern Ireland is 
lower for religious studies than for other subjects, and suggested this may be because 
schools try to avoid teaching two Christian denominations (Interviewee 5). By selecting a 
different exam awarding body for RE (such as the English Assessment and Qualification 
Alliance, AQA), schools are allowed to focus on a single Christian denomination. Thus, in 
2011 over 70% of Northern Ireland’s GCSEs in religious studies were awarded by the AQA, 
and only 26.4% by CCEA (Council for Curriculum Examination and Assessment, 2013). In 
2001, Nelson found that in the South Eastern Education and Library Board, 95% of pupils in 
controlled schools sat the CCEA exam and 90% of pupils in Catholic maintained schools sat 
the AQA exam (Nelson, 2004:  255). Thus, Catholic maintained schools may avoid teaching 
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about other Christian denominations more frequently than their controlled counterparts 
(Interviewee 5). 
Finally, interviewees propose that existing arrangements for the teaching of RE as a 
curricular subject legitimize the physical separation of children of different backgrounds into 
different school sectors: they justify the very existence of state-funded Catholic maintained 
schools (Interviewee 2; Interviewee 1), whose contribution to children’s faith development is 
increasingly crucial due to ‘increasing secularization’ (Interviewee 6). They also protect the 
influence of the Protestant Churches over controlled schools, which the churches still regard 
as ‘state-financed church-related’ schools (Nelson, 2004:  251;  Interviewee 7). Dual 
approaches to the RE curriculum influence teacher training (in two separate institutions: the 
Catholic St Mary’s College and the non-denominational Stranmillis College), teacher 
employment procedures (exempted from the fair employment regulations of the Fair 
Employment and Treatment Order, 1998), school culture, ethos, symbols, and daily routine, 
whose pace is sometimes set by prayer (Chadwick, 1994:  150, 171-172; Interviewee 1; 
Interviewee 8; Interviewee 7; Richardson, 2008-16; 2009). Thus, some of the interviewees 
suggested that RE in Northern Ireland may help entrench ‘sectarianism’ through its impact 
on the structure of the education system (Interviewee 7). 
In sum, the interviews painted a complex picture of the RE curriculum in Northern Ireland. 
The common RE curriculum helps the ‘four main Christian churches’ retain an influence over 
state-funded schools. In contrast to official documents, arrangements for the teaching of RE 
may also help reproduce the mutually exclusive identities of the local communities both 
through the syllabus contents and through their indirect influence on the structure of 
education. Whilst it is not established whether RE fosters discrimination on the basis of 
politicized confessional identities, the interviews in Northern Ireland suggest that rather than 
fostering integration and mutual understanding, RE may help reproduce different 
confessional communities largely overlapping with separate political and national groups.  
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3.3 Religious	  Education	  in	  Macedonia	  	  
Religious denomination was a salient marker of group identity in Lebanon and Northern 
Ireland long before the Taif and Belfast Agreements. In contrast, interviews with local 
experts and practitioners confirm that religion was marginal to the construction of group 
identities in socialist Macedonia, where schools did not teach RE (Interviewee 10; 
Interviewee 13; Matevski et al., 2006:  139). However, after independence in 1991, religion 
helped provide the Macedonian state-building project with historical continuity and legitimacy 
(Interviewee 12; Ivekovic, 2002:  534). A surfacing conflict between the ethnic Albanian and 
ethnic Macedonian population in the context of regional instability and violence accelerated 
a ‘vivid de-secularization process’ (Mandaci, 2007:  9) and deepened the relationship 
between political and clerical elites. These rapid socio-political changes seeped into schools 
and generated for the first time a debate over the introduction of RE as a curricular subject. 
In 1999, at the request of the Macedonian Orthodox Church, Islamic Community and 
Catholic Church, the government unilaterally introduced an hour of RE in state schools 
(Matevski et al., 2006:  140-141). The new subject was widely criticized as a form of 
indoctrination (Matevski, 2005:  5; Stavrova, 2007), which would separate pupils of different 
religious backgrounds (Matevski et al., 2006:  153). Interviewees recalled that RE was also 
criticized because it was taught by clerics, and this threatened the secular nature of 
Macedonia’s educational institutions (Interviewee 11; Interviewee 9; Matevski et al., 2006:  
142). Macedonia’s Constitutional Court confirmed that RE violated existing laws preventing 
political and religious organizations from carrying out activities in state schools (Matevski et 
al., 2006:  141). Thus, by 2001, as silently as it was introduced, RE disappeared as a 
curricular subject.  
Similarly to the Taif and Belfast Agreements, the 2001 Ohrid Agreement did not focus on 
reform of RE. Yet it postulated some constitutional amendments which increased the 
standing of the Macedonian Orthodox Church, the Islamic Community of Macedonia, the 
Roman Catholic Church, the Jewish Community and the Evangelical Methodist Church as 
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‘separate from the state and equal before the law’, and entrenched their right to establish 
charitable institutions and schools (Article 19, Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia). 
Moreover, following the 2001 conflict, ethnic Macedonian political and religious elites 
became increasingly interdependent. By 2005, the Macedonian Orthodox Church (embroiled 
in a bitter dispute with the Serbian Orthodox Church over its legitimacy and status) 
established itself as a key institutional symbol of the identity and independence of the 
Macedonian state (Quercia, 2004:  25). For its part, the Macedonian government emerged 
as a staunch defender of the independent Macedonian Orthodox Church (Quercia, 2004:  
25). In a highly symbolic gesture, the Macedonian President Branko Crvenkovski met the 
Archibishop of Ohrid and Macedonia in 2005 and during the meeting, the Archibishop 
demanded the introduction of RE in state schools (Matevski, 2005:  6). This evidence 
suggests that RE emerged as an instrument to nurture the nascent relationship between 
political and religious elites.  
In fact, by 2006, an empirical study recognized that ‘the question is not whether [RE] will be 
introduced but for whom, when and in what form’ (Matevski et al., 2006:  144). Clerics were 
the most vocal champions of RE, with the inter-faith Council for Interreligious Cooperation 
(consisting of representatives of the five confessions mentioned in the Constitution) arguing 
that RE was a taxpayer’s right and that it should be immediately introduced in schools and 
taught by clerics, ‘who believe what they say’ (Stavrova, 2007). Politicians also favoured its 
introduction in state schools, perhaps to establish some state control over its contents 
(Matevski et al., 2006:  150). An extensive consultation by the Ministry of Education found 
that the public also largely supported the introduction of RE as a curricular subject (Matevski 
et al., 2006:  144; Interviewee 14). A further poll showed that most respondents viewed RE 
as an instrument allowing for the ‘preservation of religious communities’ and the 
transmission of their values and customs to children (Center for Research and Policymaking, 
2006:  5). In other words, in post-2001 Macedonia, RE was expected to help consolidate 
religious identities overlapping with ethnic, linguistic and political allegiances.  
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In 2007, the Macedonian Parliament amended the Law on Education and the Law on 
Religious Freedom (US Department of State, 2008). Skeptical as to the ultimate aim of these 
amendments, the US Embassy observed that the government was ‘bucking the constitution 
to give youth what they don’t want’: confessional RE in state schools (US Embassy Skopje, 
2009a). Indeed, in September 2008 the government introduced a weekly hour of RE for 
pupils 10-11 years old (US Department of State, 2008). The new RE curriculum was drafted 
by the Islamic and Orthodox Christian clergies and approved by the Ministry of Education 
(US Embassy Skopje, 2009a). News reports and interviews confirm that RE was 
immediately contested first because most of the proposed teachers were graduates of 
theological faculties unrecognized by the state (Interviewee 9; Interviewee 11; Stavrova, 
2007), and their teaching could ‘turn our schools into churches and mosques’ (Balkan 
Insight, 2009b). Many claimed that the very presence of religious figures on school premises 
violated state secularism (Interviewee 9; Interviewee 11; Karajkov, 2009; Balkan Insight, 
2009a), and would end up ‘blurring the lines separating church and state’ (US Embassy 
Skopje, 2009a).  
Second, arrangements for RE were criticized for ‘adding another layer of academic 
separation beyond the existing linguistic barrier between ethnic Macedonian and ethnic 
Albanian students’ (US Embassy Skopje, 2009a; Interviewee 11). The public supported 
introducing a subject about religion, but it largely opposed separating children along religious 
lines and requested suitable arrangements for students belonging to faiths other than the 
Christian Orthodox and Muslim (US Department of State, 2010). In contrast, the new 
curriculum appeared to further the identification of ethnic Macedonians with Orthodox 
Christianity and ethnic Albanians with Islam. 
In April 2009 the Constitutional Court ruled that RE threatened the constitutional separation 
of church and state and should be suspended (Karajkov, 2009; Balkan Insight, 2009b ; US 
Department of State, 2009). In contrast to its silent elimination in 2001, the elimination of RE 
in 2009 inflamed public opinion, with protesters calling for an end to the Constitutional 
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Court’s ‘atheist dictatorship’ (Karajkov, 2009). This may be because of the emergence of RE 
as a symbol of collective rights to reproduce communal identities through state institutions 
after 2001. Evidence from the media and official documents suggests that protests against 
the elimination of the weekly hour of RE also reflect the deepening alliance of some political 
and religious elites. Indeed, the Council for Interreligious Cooperation announced its 
intention to keep lobbying for the reintroduction of confessional RE (Balkan Insight, 2009d; 
US Embassy Skopje, 2009b), whilst the majority ethnic Macedonian party vowed to bypass 
the Constitutional Court and introduce constitutional amendments to make RE compulsory 
once and for all (US Embassy Skopje, 2009b). Education Minister Nicola Todorov assured 
that ‘the reintroduction of [RE] classes is a sure thing’ (Balkan Insight, 2009c). Witnessing 
these events, the UN Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Religion and Belief warned that 
‘the two major religious communities in the country [Christian Orthodox and Muslim] wield 
considerable political influence and are eroding the division between religion and State’ 
(Djenovic, 2009).  
True to Todorov’s promise, in September 2010 a new RE curriculum was introduced for 
pupils 9-10 years old (Bureau for Development of Education of the Republic of Macedonia, 
2008a, 2008b). It was swiftly denounced as a ‘way around the constitutional ban’ and an 
expedient to reintroduce confessional RE ‘by small steps’ (Djenovic, 2009). The new subject 
is taught by a theology graduate and provides some information about the five religious 
confessions mentioned in the Macedonian Constitution (Bureau for Development of 
Education of the Republic of Macedonia, 2008a; Interviewee 9; Balkan Insight, 2008) This 
allows children to learn about other groups in the state, but also exemplifies the increasing 
alliance between political parties and the religious institutions mentioned in the Constitution 
(Balkan Insight, 2008; UNICEF Country Office Skopje, 2009:  78). However, over half of the 
RE curriculum focuses exclusively on a particular religious confession (generally the religion 
of the majority of children in the class) (Bureau for Development of Education of the 
Republic of Macedonia, 2008a). The curriculum also aims at teaching for belief (Bureau for 
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Development of Education of the Republic of Macedonia, 2008a). Despite this, interviewees 
unanimously agreed that the new RE curriculum is less controversial than its predecessors 
(Interviewee 9 expressed this most clearly). 
News reports and empirical studies suggest that RE may directly and indirectly contribute to 
what some see as the ‘promotion of two faith communities’ overlapping with ethno-national 
and political cleavages (Interviewee 11; Djenovic, 2009; Fontana, 2013). This is first 
because, similarly to RE in Lebanon and Northern Ireland, RE in Macedonia may further the 
physical and psychological separation of children of different backgrounds. One of the 
interviewees, for example, claimed that most ethnic Macedonian children are exempted from 
RE whilst most ethnic Albanian children attend the course (Interviewee 11). Moreover, the 
literature suggests that religious institutions (particularly the Macedonian Orthodox Church) 
benefit from opportunities for outreach among children belonging to their ethno-linguistic 
community (Matevska, 2011:  131; Matevski, 2009:  3; Mirascieva et al., 2011:  1405). 
Finally, reports have emerged that ethnic Albanians may employ Islam to assimilate smaller 
communities such as the Roma and the Turks into their ethno-political flock (Mandaci, 2007:  
9-12; Sidiropoulos, 1999:  146). This was not confirmed in the interviews, but – if accurate - 
would endow RE with an important function in extending the political constituency of ethnic 
Albanian parties.  
In sum, the evidence collected in Macedonia suggests that, after 2001, RE emerged as a 
tool to sanction and nurture the relationship between some political and religious elites, to 
help religious institutions gain some influence over the contents of education in state-funded 
schools, and to cement the mutually exclusive ethno-political identities of Albanians and 
Macedonians (Fontana, 2013). 
4 Discussion	  and	  Conclusion	  
The existing literature about RE in deeply divided societies points at two core hypotheses as 
to the form and political function of the RE curriculum in deeply divided societies. The first 
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hypothesis is that RE tends to reproduce separate and mutually exclusive communities 
through a curriculum designed to nurture children’s sense of belonging to a faith community. 
The second hypothesis is that RE furthers mutual understanding, ecumenism and social 
cohesion among members previously warring communities by transmitting knowledge about 
several religions and encouraging dialogue and comparison. This article analysed 
arrangements for the teaching of RE as a curricular subject in three post-conflict societies 
adopting power-sharing to explore the extent to which RE complies with the two hypotheses 
in the literature. Due to the limited number of case studies and interviewees in each 
jurisdiction, further research is necessary before generalizing the present findings to all 
societies adopting consociational power-sharing.  
Evidence about the political function of RE in Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia 
prior to their current peace agreements suggests that the very existence of RE as a 
curricular subject depends on two factors: whether religion is a salient marker of belonging, 
and whether the interests of religious and political elites converge. This is most evident in 
the case of Macedonia, where the first calls for the introduction of RE can be traced back to 
the late 1990s, and intensified after the Ohrid Agreement, in parallel with deepening inter-
ethnic tensions. During the conflicts in Lebanon and Northern Ireland, RE (alongside other 
subjects) directly and indirectly helped socialize children into mutually exclusive confessional 
identities, overlapping with different ethno-national and political allegiances. This is why, 
despite being overlooked in the peace agreements, RE emerged as an object for reform in 
the three societies.  
The interviews carried out in Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia add an important 
dimension to the understanding of the political function of RE in deeply divided societies 
adopting consociational power-sharing. They suggest that debates over RE in the three 
societies were informed by similar tensions between those supporting a non-confessional, 
comparative approach to RE promoting integration and social cohesion, and those calling for 
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faith development and the protection of communal cultures. This suggests a convergence in 
the educational debates of the three societies after the establishment of power-sharing.  
Second, power-sharing governments recognized the special interest of religious institutions 
in RE and gave dominant local faith communities a right to shape the curriculum, often at the 
expenses of smaller or non-native groups. For example, in Northern Ireland, it appears that 
state institutions assume that only the ‘four main Churches’ have a legitimate interest in the 
RE syllabus (Interviewee 5; Interviewee 7). The recognition of this special interest generated 
a dual curriculum, allowing for a confessional RE in Catholic maintained schools and a non-
denominational (but Christian-focused) RE in controlled schools. Similarly, in post-Taif 
Lebanon, politicians and technocrats hoped that a unified RE curriculum could ‘make people 
belong to the same national values, [to] freedom, [to] democracy’ (Interviewee 21) but 
religious authorities insisted on a confessional RE for socialization in a particular faith 
community. The latter perspective came to dominate, and RE in Lebanon’s schools remains 
firmly under the control of Lebanese religious authorities. The case of Macedonia also 
suggests that RE is often employed to nurture the relationship between religious and political 
elites. Experts and policymakers agree that in the instable and polarized post-2001 context, 
political parties recognized that religious institutions could help cement local ethno-linguistic 
communities, largely coinciding with their political constituencies (Interviewee 10).  
Third, this article shows that RE has a remarkably similar political function in consociational 
Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia: it tends to reproduce separate and mutually 
exclusive communities. RE contents and pedagogy reflect the assumption that children 
belong to one of several mutually exclusive and clearly demarcated confessional groups. 
Thus, curricula aim to teach, and sometimes practice, the faith children were born into. In 
Northern Ireland and Lebanon, religious denomination remains an impermeable marker of 
communal identity, but RE is not an instrument for proselytism outside the confines of a 
specific religious group. This may exemplify a minimum level of tolerance, mutual respect 
and recognition among previously warring communities. This is not the case in Macedonia, 
 23 
where some members of the Turkish and Roma communities denounced RE as an 
instrument to marginalize or assimilate children belonging to smaller ethno-linguistic 
communities.  
These findings have important implications for an understanding of the contribution of RE to 
peace and social cohesion in post-conflict deeply divided societies. They confirm the first 
hypothesis as to the political function of RE after violent conflicts: by nurturing children’s 
sense of belonging to a faith community, current arrangements for RE directly and indirectly 
help socialize children in the culture and practices of discreet ethnic, national and 
confessional communities. This approach does not explicitly foster mutual understanding, 
ecumenism and social cohesion among members of previously warring groups. In fact, 
many warn that it may help socialize students into the cultural milieus for inter-communal 
conflict (Richardson, 2008:  2) and even translate political conflicts into an absolute ‘struggle 
between Good and Evil’ (Koppa, 2001: 45).  
However, RE may contribute to peace and stability in more complex and indirect ways. As 
mentioned, consociational power-sharing, rather than eroding inter-group boundaries, 
‘make[s] societies more thoroughly plural’ in the short term (Lijphart, 1977: 42). Thus, 
perhaps RE is one of the tools to legitimize and entrench this political system by reproducing 
those previously warring ethnic, national and confessional communities that now share 
political power. Indeed, proponents of a confessional approach to RE argue that only 
individuals and communities that are conscious and secure in their faith and culture can 
engage peacefully with others (Interviewee 1; Matevski, 2009:  7). In the short term, this 
approach may signal the state’s respect for its faith communities, and the inclusion of their 
political and religious elites in decision-making. Moreover, if ‘one of the greatest dangers 
confronted by religion and religious communities is that of assimilation and syncretism’ 
(Kassis, 2002:  368-369), then current approaches to RE may help allay the existential fears 
of previously warring communities in Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Macedonia. This could 
help promote short-term political stability, political legitimacy and even peace. However, its 
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long-term consequences are more ambiguous, because current arrangements for RE 
contribute to entrenching existing cleavages, and shy away from challenging ‘prejudice and 
indoctrination… through those very aspects of education where there might appear to be the 
greatest danger of them occurring’ (Richardson, 2013: 9).  
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